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Abstract
Wireless sensor network comprises of small sensor nodes 
with limited resources. Clustered networks have been 
proposed in many researches to reduce the power 
consumption in sensor networks. LEACH is one of the 
most interested techniques that offer an efficient way to 
minimize the power consumption in sensor networks. 
However, due to the characteristics of restricted 
resources and operation in a hostile environment, WSNs 
are subjected to numerous threats and are vulnerable to 
attacks. This research proposes a solution that can be 
applied on LEACH to increase the level of security. In 
Watchdog-LEACH, some nodes are considered as 
watchdogs and some changes are applied on LEACH 
protocol for intrusion detection. Watchdog-LEACH is 
able to protect against a wide range of attacks and it 
provides security, energy efficiency and memory 
efficiency. The result of simulation shows that in 
comparison to LEACH, the energy overhead is about 2% 
so this method is practical and can be applied to WSNs.
Keywords: LEACH, Wireless sensor networks, 
clustered, Watchdog-LEACH, security
1.   Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) comprise of one 
or more base stations (BSs) that can communicate 
with a number of wireless sensors via a radio link. 
WSNs are playing an increasingly important role in 
a wide-range of applications. They are used for 
monitoring purposes, and can be used in different 
application areas, ranging from battlefield 
reconnaissance to environmental protection. 
Cluster-based communication protocols (e.g., [1]) 
have been proposed for ad hoc networks in general 
and sensor networks in particular for various 
reasons including scalability and energy efficiency. 
In cluster-based networks, nodes are organized into 
clusters, with cluster heads (CHs) that they relay 
messages from ordinary nodes in the cluster to the 
BSs. As our approach is based on LEACH protocol 
we describe LEACH protocol here.
LEACH [1] is a clustering-based protocol that 
minimizes energy dissipation in sensor networks. 
The purpose of LEACH is to select sensor nodes 
randomly as cluster heads, so the high energy 
dissipation in communicating with the base station 
is spread to all sensor nodes in the sensor network. 
The operation of LEACH is separated into two 
phases: the set-up phase and the steady phase. The 
duration of the steady phase is longer than the 
duration of the set-up phase in order to minimize 
the overhead. During the set-up phase, a sensor 
node n chooses a random number between 0 and 1. 
If this random number is less than a predetermined 
threshold, t, the sensor node becomes a cluster 
head. The threshold t is calculated as:
Formula 1: Threshold to be a CH
In this equation P is the desired percentage to 
become a cluster head, r is the current round and G 
is the set of nodes that have not been selected as a 
cluster head in the last 1/P rounds. After a node is 
self-selected as a cluster head, it advertises this to 
all its neighbors. The sensor nodes receive 
advertisements and they determine the cluster that 
they want to belong to, based on the signal strength 
of the advertisements from the cluster heads. The 
sensor nodes inform their cluster head that they 
will be a member of the cluster, and then the cluster 
head assigns a time slot for every sensor node in 
which they can send data to the cluster head.
During the steady phase, the sensor nodes can 
begin sensing and transmitting data to the cluster 
heads. The cluster heads also aggregate data from 
the nodes in their cluster before sending them to the 
base station. After a certain period of time is spent 
in the steady phase, the network goes into the set-
up phase again.
LEACH balances the draining of the energy during 
communication between nodes in sensor networks. 
The BS assumed to be directly reachable by all 
nodes by transmitting with high enough power. 
Nodes send their sensor reports to their CHs, which 
then combine the reports in one aggregated report 
and send it to the BS. To avoid the energy draining 
of limited sets of CHs, LEACH rotates CHs 
randomly among all sensors in the network in order 
to distribute the energy consumption among all 
sensors.
The recent solutions with encryption provide 
security against attacks, but this paper supplies 
CH’s security and also other nodes in a new 
method. The rest of this paper is organized as 
follows: In the next section we present some 
related works. In Section 3, we outline security in 
LEACH. In Section 4, we present the Watchdog-
LEACH. In Section 5, we show Energy 
Consumption, Finally in section 6, conclude this 
paper.
2.   Related Works
Protection in the most situations is provided by 
encryption. For example encryption with 
symmetric key based security building blocks [2], 
or random key pre-distribution schemes [3], or 
using authentication framework [4].  S-LEACH [5] 
using two keys for each sensor node and a unique 
key shared with BS and the last key of the one-way 
key chain created by BS. S-LEACH can provide 
message authenticate via a message authentication 
code (MAC), which is computed by the unique key 
shared with BS. The nodes can identify the 
malicious CHs and choose the credible CH to join 
the cluster with the help of BS. However, because 
the choice of credible CHs over-relies on the 
participation of BS, the expansion of WSNs 
becomes impossible. Secure LEACH (Sec-
LEACH) [6] uses a pre-distributed static key 
management scheme. In Sec-LEACH, each node is 
pre-distributed K keys drawn from a key pool 
which contains P keys. One of the major 
advantages provided by Sec-LEACH is that the 
authenticated and secure communication between 
CH and member nodes can be achieved without the 
participation of BS.
The operation of Armor-LEACH [7] combines the 
operations of TCCA [8] and Sec-LEACH. Time-
Controlled Clustering Algorithm (TCCA) provides 
LEACH with more energy control results in less 
power consumption. Sec-LEACH provides 
LEACH with high level of security against many 
kinds of attacks. Armor-LEACH proposes a 
solution for sensor networks communications, 
where it offers high level of security with high 
performance. 
Some papers present methods for preservation of 
particular attacks. In [9] is proposed a security 
mechanism based on LEACH routing protocol 
against Sybil attack. The mechanism is set to start 
up Sybil attack detection policy based on RSSI 
(Received signal strength indicator) when the 
cluster-heads number in WSN is over a threshold. 
In [10] is proposed a scheme considering cluster 
architecture based on LEACH protocol to build a 
security mechanism in a query-processing 
paradigm within wireless sensor network. The 
scheme is capable of thwarting replay attack while 
ensuring essential properties of security such as 
authentication, data integrity and data freshness. 
TLEACH is a WSN trust protocol [11]. TLEACH 
contains two main components, the Monitoring 
Module and the Trust Evaluation Module. Each 
node also maintains a Neighbor Situational Trust 
Table (NSTT) filled with trust value entries for 
each pair of node ids and situational operations. 
Situational operations, such as data sensing and 
routing, each have an individual trust value because 
nodes may not behave maliciously for all 
operations.
CSLEACH [12] (Centralized Secure Low Energy 
Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) utilizes the 
gateway for key management, and trust 
management. CSLEACH builds on the LEACH 
algorithm by adding authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity, freshness and trust. Like LEACH, each 
sensor node is able to directly transmit to the 
gateway. Using a Key Distribution Center (KDC) 
approach, each node shares a unique private key 
with the gateway. CSLEACH uses single key pre-
distribution to share a gateway private key that is 
used for broadcast authentication.
3.   Security in LEACH
Like any wireless ad hoc network, WSNs are 
vulnerable to attacks [13, 14]. Besides the well-
known vulnerabilities due to wireless 
communication and ad hoc, WSNs face additional 
problems, including sensor nodes being small, 
cheap devices that are unlikely to be made tamper-
resistant or tamper-proof; and they are being left 
unattended once deployed in unprotected, or even 
hostile areas which makes them easily accessible to 
malicious parties. It is therefore crucial to add 
security to WSNs, especially those embedded in 
mission-critical applications.
Few papers focused on the security of WSNs even 
that the nature of this kind of networks may leads 
to low level of security which make these networks 
easy targets for intruders. Low Energy Adaptive 
Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) provides an 
efficient communication protocol for WSNs to 
reduce power consumption and at the same time to 
provide some level of security. Though LEACH 
has several good qualities which have been widely 
accepted for various researches in the field of 
WSN, it has a hitch attached to it like any other 
WSN when we consider security factor. As control 
is distributed throughout the network of making 
self-organization possible, the CH nodes play an 
important role in the network. Hence they become 
a very attractive vulnerable point to the attackers. 
Like most of the protocols for WSNs, LEACH is 
vulnerable to a number of security attacks 
including jamming, spoofing, replay. But because it 
is a cluster-based protocol, relying on their CHs for 
routing, attacks involving CHs are the most 
damaging. If an intruder manages to become a CH, 
it can do some attacks such as sinkhole and 
selective forwarding, thus disrupting the network. 
The intruder may also try to inject bogus sensor 
data into the network. 
Attacks to WSNs may come from outsiders or 
insiders. In cryptographically protected networks, 
outsiders do not have credentials to show that they 
are members of the network, whereas; insiders do. 
Insiders may not always be trustworthy, as they 
may have been compromised, or have stolen their 
credentials from some legitimate node in the 
network. 
This paper suggests a new solution to prevent WSN 
from being affected by intruders and thwarting 
some attacks.
4.   Watchdog-LEACH
In this new method we have added some parts to 
LEACH protocol to make it more secure.
In Watchdog-LEACH we use Spontaneous 
Watchdogs approach [15] that we have added it 
before steady phase. Also we use Decentralized 
Intrusion Detection [16] method in setup and
steady phase for Intrusion Detection. On figure 1, 
LEACH protocol stages and on figure 2, 
Watchdog-LEACH phases has been shown.
4.1. Watchdog-LEACH Phases
4.1.1. Phase 1 _ Setup Phase
It's like LEACH setup phase as we described it in 
Introduction section (section1) but except first 
round, we have intrusion by Watchdog nodes for 
probable attacks too.
4.1.2. Phase 2 _ Selecting Watchdog nodes
For selecting watchdog nodes we use Spontaneous 
Watchdogs approach as following.
Each node has a monitoring module that is 
activated upon selecting as a watchdog node. This 
monitoring module must be in charge of analyzing 
packets that their neighbors in a cluster send and 
receive. Maybe they receive some packets from 
other clusters but they ignore signals from other 
clusters.
Other sensors also can generate some alerts 
depends on the situation so their monitoring 
module can be started to work in some situations 
like attacks against the physical or logical safety of 
sensor but they don't check other nodes 
communications.
Due to the broadcast nature of communications, 
every watchdog node will receive all packets sent 
inside its cluster.
A single node will select itself as a watchdog for a 
cluster with a probability of 1/n. This process can 
resemble as n people with 1 dice of m sides each, 
where n = m, trying to obtain a 1 in the dice to 
activate the watchdog node.
If a node has been selected as a CH in previous 
phase, it's not selected as a watchdog in a cluster.
There isn't any extra energy consumption overhead 
for the decision of being a watchdog node as we 
assume that the result has been calculated before 
and has been embedded to the sensors.
Setup phase:
1.  ⇒  		 ∶ 	    ,    
2.    →  	 ∶      ,     ,     _   
3.   ⇒  		 ∶     ,  	… , 〈     ,    〉,…  ,   ℎ  
Steady phase:
4.    →  		 ∶     ,    
5. 	 →    ∶     ,     , ℱ(	… ,     , … )
The various symbols denote:  
  
   ,  ,    : 		Sensor	Nodes,	CH,	Base	Station
  :			All	WSN	Nodes
    	,     ,     	: ID	for	nodes, CHs,BS
→,⇒	: Communication	between	nodes
adv,	 join_ req, sched	:			Message	kinds
〈     ,    〉    : Data	message	from	CH	to	other	cluster	nodes	including	their	IDs	and	time	frame	for	
sending	data	
    : Sensed data	by	Node	x
ℱ : 		Aggregation	Function
Figure 1: LEACH protocol  
  
  
  
Setup phase:
1.  ⇒  	 ∶ 	    ,           
     													  ∶ 	      	     	    :
																						  	        (    ,    )	,     	(id ,         ) ℎ  	   	1	  	 ℎ 	   
																												  	   	     ,      	(id ,          ,     ,     = 0)		
2.    →   ∶      ,     ,         	,     ∉                  
																				 :	      	     	     :
																													  	              ,     ,         	 	,     	 id   ,           ℎ  	   	1	  	 ℎ 	   
																													  	   	     ,      	 id   ,          ,     ,     = 0 		
3.   ⇒   ∶     ,  	… , 〈     ,    〉,…  ,   ℎ  									
												 :       	     	    :
													  	             ,  	… , 〈     ,    〉,…  ,   ℎ   	,     	(id ,         ) ℎ  	   	1	  	 ℎ 	   
														  	   	     ,      	(id ,          ,     ,     = 0)		
Selecting Watchdog nodes phase:
4. :      	      	  	 	    ℎ   ,  ∈  ,  ∉  
Steady and Intrusion Detection phase: 
5.    →  :     ,    	(	   ∉ 	 )
				   → BS ∶ id   ,          ,     ,    	(	   ∈ 	 , Sum > 	 ℎ   ℎ   	)	            
											 :   	             ,     	,     	 id   ,           ℎ  	   	1	  	 ℎ 	   	   	      	    
																	  	   	     ,      	 id   ,          ,     ,     = 0 		
6.   →    ∶     ,     , ℱ 	… ,     , …  
													 :   	              ,     , ℱ 	… ,     , …   	 ,     	(id ,         ) ℎ  	   	1	  	 ℎ 	   
																				  	   	     ,      	 id   ,          ,     ,     = 0 		
7.   	 →  	,  	… , id   , …  	, id   ∈          
Symbols as previously defined, with the following additions:
 : Watchdog	Nodes
Store:	 Storing	detected	attack
Threshold:		Maximum	number	of	attacks	that	can	be	ignored	by	Watchdog
Black List: List	of	intruder	nodes
Figure 2: Watchdog-LEACH protocol  
  
The probability that α nodes have to activate their 
monitoring module at the same time is given by the 
following equation:
 ( ,  , ) = 	
      ,  . (  − 1)   	
   , 
      ,  =	
 !
(  − 	 )!	.  !
   ,  =   
Formula 2: Watchdog selection formula
Where ,nnPR   is the formula of permutation with 
repeated elements, VRm,n is the formula of
r-permutations with repetition, n is the number of 
nodes that could activate their monitoring module 
to be watchdog (i.e., the number of nodes that are 
going to throw a dice), and m is the number of 
nodes that are going to influence on the probability 
of activating the watchdog nodes, normally equal to 
n (i.e., the number of sides of every dice).
Proof of Formula 2 is available in [15] appendix.
4.1.3. Phase 3 _ Steady Phase and Intrusion 
Detection
Steady phase in Watchdog-LEACH is similar to 
Steady phase in LEACH protocol with some 
differences. Watchdog nodes doesn't sense 
environment signal and they work only as 
watchdog and monitor the cluster communications 
both regular nodes and CH. This behavior prevents 
from collisions as Watchdog-LEACH is TDMA-
Based in Steady phase. 
4.2. Intrusion Detection 
Watchdog nodes are independent from CHs so they 
also monitor CHs behavior. During Steady phase, 
watchdog nodes listen to communications and 
when they detect an attack they send alarm to BS 
directly. In Watchdog-Leach we use Decentralized 
Intrusion Detection [16] approach for detecting 
attacks and sending report to BS. After each round, 
Black listed nodes are reported to all nodes so after 
that, other nodes will ignore messages from black 
listed nodes and they will not be selected as CH in 
next rounds.
The proposed algorithm was divided into the 
following phases: 
4.2.1. Data acquisition: in this phase, messages are 
collected in a promiscuous mode and the important 
information is filtered before being stored, for 
subsequent analysis. Data extracted from the 
messages are stored in an array data structure and 
discarded after a given period of time or when there 
is no space left in memory. 
4.2.2. Rule application: this is the processing 
phase, when the rules are applied to the stored data.
If the message analysis fails the tests being applied, 
a failure is raised. If a message fails in one of the 
rules, a failure counter is incremented.
4.2.3. Intrusion detection: In this phase, the 
number of raised failures is compared to the 
expected amount of occasional failures in the 
network. If failure rate is higher than expected 
amount, intrusion detection is raised and an alert 
message is sent to BS. In other words, an attack 
indication is only signaled by the watchdog node 
when an abnormal behavior occurs with a 
frequency higher than expected. 
On Figure 3 Intrusion Detection algorithm has been 
shown.
1: for all neighbors in Cluster do
2: for all failure types do
3: if round-failure value > 
cumulative value then
4:       signal attack indication
5: else
6:       update cumulative value 
by combining it with round-failure value                             
7:      end if
8: end for
9: end for
Figure 3: Intrusion Detection algorithm
4.3. Rules
4.3.1. Interval rule: a failure is raised if the time 
past between the reception of two consecutive 
messages is larger or smaller than the allowed 
limits. Two attacks that will probably be detected 
by this rule are the negligence attack, in which the 
intruder does not send data messages generated by 
a tampered node, and the exhaustion attack, in 
which the intruder increments the message sending 
rate in order to increase the energy consumption of 
its neighbors.
4.3.2. Retransmission rule: the monitor listens to 
a message, pertaining to one of its neighbors as its 
next hop, and expects that this node will forward 
the received message, which does not happen. Two 
types of attacks that can be detected by this rule are 
the black-hole and the selective forwarding attack. 
In both of them, the intruder suppresses some or all 
messages that were supposed to be retransmitted, 
preventing them from reaching their final 
destination in the network.
4.3.3. Integrity rule: the message payload must be 
the same along the path from its origin to a 
destination, considering that in the retransmission 
process there is no data fusion or aggregation by 
other sensor nodes. Attacks where the intruder 
modifies the contents of a received message can be
detected by this rule.
4.3.4. Delay rule: the retransmission of a message 
by a monitor’s neighbor must occur before a 
defined timeout. Otherwise, an attack will be 
detected.
4.3.5. Repetition rule: the same message can be 
retransmitted by the same neighbor only a limited 
number of times. This rule can detect an attack 
where the intruder sends the same message several 
times.
4.3.6. Jamming rule: the number of collisions 
associated with a message sent by the monitor must 
be lower than the expected number in the network. 
The jamming attack, where a node introduces noise 
into the network to disturb the communication
channel, can be detected by this rule.
4.3.7. Radio transmission range rule: Each node 
must send its message with a specified power so 
only its neighbors can listen these messages and 
sending more powerful messages can be detected 
as hello-flood or wormhole attack. 
4.3.8 Alarm rule: When a sensor is tampered or 
re-programmed or moved, a failure is raised.
4.3.9. Intruder Watchdog rule: When Watchdog 
itself is intruder, by this rule is recognized. In this 
case, intruder sends invalid information to BS.
4.4. Solutions for attacks
We have considered some attacks in our work 
against WSN and watchdog-LEACH's solution for 
them and related rule is as following.
4.4.1. Hello Flood Attack: (Radio transmission 
range rule) after Steady phase in LEACH protocol, 
all current clustered are canceled and new CHs start 
to advertise. Because watchdog nodes are cluster 
independent, they remain active until new clusters 
are formed. So watchdog nodes can listen to the 
advertisement messages from new CHs and if the 
signal strength of Hello packets are more than 
threshold level, so watchdog nodes send an alert to 
BS for quarantining the adversary node. After that 
the new watchdog nodes are selected by 
themselves.
4.4.2. Message Delay, Repetition, Jamming: 
(Interval rule, Delay rule, Repetition rule and 
Jamming rule) Watchdog nodes can detect it if a 
sensor sends messages with delay or they repeat a 
message. Maybe a sensor doesn't have enough 
energy to send messages or maybe it's under an 
attack so it should be excluded from network. Or 
maybe an adversary node sends repetitive messages 
to jam CH or for sending wrong information to CH.
4.4.3. Black-hole and Selective Forwarding:
(Delay rule and Retransmission rule) Sometimes 
intruder node as a regular node or CH, doesn't send 
messages to related CH or BS and it drops the 
message or sends it to another malicious node or 
network. Watchdog nodes can detects these types 
of attacks by checking the packet destination and 
CH activities and communications.
4.4.4. Physical attack: (Alarm rule) Sometimes a 
sensor is damaged physically or re-programmed or 
moved to another place. In this case, sensor sends 
an alarm and watchdog nodes report it to BS.
4.4.5. Intruder Watchdog: (Intruder Watchdog 
rule) In this case, watchdog itself is an intruder and 
sends wrong info to the BS and reports invalid 
attacks. For solving this problem, other watchdogs 
in the cluster, compare the reported attack with 
their info. If there is a difference between their info 
and received report, they report an attack to BS.
Other attacks can be prevented with authentication 
and encryption or other methods that can be applied 
to Watchdog-LEACH protocol. We assume that we 
have encrypted all messages with a pre-distributed 
and hardware embedded key and MAC is 
calculated and added to each message.
4.5. Security Comparison with other protocols
On Table 1, we have a comparison between 
Watchdog-LEACH and other famous methods that 
have been applied on LEACH for more security.
Watchdog
LEACH
CSLEACH  TLEACH  LEACH  
Yes  MACNo  No  Integrity
Yes  
Pre-
distributed
Keys
No  No  Authentication
Yes  
Symmetric 
Key
Encryption
No  No  Confidentiality  
Watchdogs  TC  
NSTT /
Monitoring
Neighbors  
No  Trust  
Table 1: Comparison between Watchdog-LEACH
and other famous related protocols
5. Energy Consumption
In a simulation we used [1] assumptions as 
following:
Eelec = 50 nJ/bit
amp = 100 pJ/bit/m2 = 0.1 nJ/bit/m2
Data rate = 2000bits/s
Data package size = 2000-bit
Signal package size = 64-bit
So required values for energy consumption is 
calculated on table 2.
Value  Energy Consumption type  
100 
µJ/message  
Receive a data 
message  
3 µJ/message  Receive a signal 
message  
820 
µJ/message  
Send a data message 
(d<= 60m)  
26 µJ/messageSend a signal 
message
(d<=60m)  
ETx_data = 
Eelec* k-
bit/message + 
amp*k*d2 =100 
µJ + 0.1 nJ*d2  
Send a message 
(d > 60m)  
  
Table 2: Required amounts for WSN energy 
consumption calculation
Also we considered a WSN with 1000 nodes and 
100 clusters. Total rounds is 1000 and steady 
phase rounds number is 10. Also we assume that 
maximum attacks have been occurred (10 attacks). 
The average distance from any node to BS is 100m. 
For total network energy consumption calculation, 
we need to calculate CH energy (Formula 3), 
Watchdog energy (Formula 4), Sensor energy
(Formula 5) . Total Energy formula is shown on 
Formula 6.
 (  	  	     ) =  (   ) + (  − 1).  (   )
+  (   )
 (  	     	         ) ≈ 0	
 (  	  	      	 ℎ   ) = (  − 1).    +        
 (  	     ) =  (  	  	     )
+  (  	     	         )
+ 	 (  	  	      	 ℎ   ).    		
The various symbols denote:
  ∶       
    ∶        	      	       
    ∶        	    	       
    ∶ 	         	      	       
    ∶ 	         	    	       
        ∶        	    	       	  	  
  ∶       	  	       	  	 	       
   :      	  	      	  	      	 ℎ   
Formula 3: CH energy
 ( 	     ) =     + (  − 1).    +     +    
 ( 	     	         ) ≈ 0
 ( 	      	 ℎ   	   ℎ   	      ) = (  − 1).    		
 ( 	      	 ℎ   	   ℎ	      )
= (  − 1).    +        		
 ( 	     )
=  ( 	     ) +  (         	    ℎ   	    )
+ (    −    ). ( 	      	 ℎ   	   ℎ   	      )
+    .  ( 	      	 ℎ   	   ℎ	      )		
Symbols as previously defined, with the following 
additions:
 :    ℎ   	    
    ∶       	  	       
Formula 4: Watchdog energy
 (	 	     ) = 	    +    +    
 ( 	      	 ℎ   ) =    
 ( 	     ) = 	 (	 	     ) +    .  ( 	      	 ℎ   )
Symbols as previously defined, with the following 
additions:
  ∶       
Formula 5: Sensor energy
 (       	     ) =
[ (  	     ) + (    .  ( 	     ) + (   -
	     − 1). ( 	     )].    .      +     .    	
Symbols as previously defined, with the following 
additions:
    :	      	  	    ℎ   	     	  	 	       
   :	      	  	        
    :	      	  	       	  	 	       
    :	      	  	       	       
Formula 6: Total network energy
With our assumptions we have following values (Table3) 
so we can calculate Total network energy consumption 
with consideration of Watchdog numbers in each cluster 
(Figure 4). According to Figure 4, with each additional 
Watchdog nodes, 2% is added to total energy 
consumption. So our protocol has about 2% energy 
overhead in comparison to LEACH protocol. This result 
shows that our proposed method is practical and can be 
applied on WSNs.
Energy Formula  Value(J)  
 (  	  	     ) 0.000873
 (  	     	         ) 0
 (  	  	      	 ℎ   ) 0.001001
 (  	     ) 0.010883
 ( 	     ) 0.000156
 ( 	     	         ) 0
 ( 	      	 ℎ   	   ℎ   	      ) 0.0009
 ( 	      	 ℎ   	   ℎ	      ) 0.001001
 ( 	     ) 0.010166
 (	 	     ) 0.000129
 ( 	      	 ℎ   ) 0.00082
 ( 	     ) 0.008329
Table 3: Energy Amounts
Figure 4: Total Network Energy Consumption (J)
vs. Number of Watchdog nodes in each cluster
Also in Figure 5, watchdog node Energy 
consumption based on number of attacks has been 
shown. According to Figure 5 results and Table 3, 
in maximum number of attacks, consumed energy 
for a watchdog node is less than a CH. For this 
calculation we considered the threshold to be 1 so 
any time a watchdog recognizes an attack, it reports 
to BS. But in real protocol, it reports to BS after 
some attacks so the real energy consumption will 
be less than these results.
Figure 5: Watchdog Node Energy Consumption (  ) vs. 
Number of Attacks
6.  Conclusion
Watchdog-LEACH can be used to increase WSN 
security. Also it can be combined with other 
methods (authentication, encryption and etc.) to 
provide more security for WSN. This approach is 
CH and cluster independent and it can detect 
malicious CHs too that we didn't have this feature 
in previous methods. Our detection is decentralized 
since the monitor modules are distributed on 
network, installed in common nodes.
Also this method in comparison to LEACH has 
about 2% energy overhead so this method is 
practical and can be applied to WSNs.
For future works, this method can be upgraded to a 
lightweight detection framework for prevention and 
detection of common attacks in WSNs.
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